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United States v. Roane
378 F.3d 382 (4th Cir. 2004)

L Facts
In August 1990 Richard Tipton and CoryJohnson brought their NewJersey
drug trafficking business to Richmond, Virginia. After police in NewJersey shut
down the Trenton wing of the operation in the summer of 1991, James Roane
joined Tipton and Johnson in expanding the Richmond business throughout the
Central Gardens and Newtowne areas of the city. The operation's business
included garnering powdered cocaine from New York City, "cooking" it to create
crack cocaine, and distributing the crack among sellers in Richmond. At the
beginning of 1992, in what was apparently a series of retaliatory responses to
deals gone wrong, unwanted competition, and personal affronts, Tipton,
Johnson, and Roane combined to murder ten people in Richmond.'
Federal prosecutors charged Tipton, Johnson, and Roane with capital
murder under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) for intentionally killing the ten people in
furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE").2 After a trial in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the jury
convicted Tipton on six of eight capital murder charges.' The jury also convicted
him of conspiracy to possess cocaine base with the intent to distribute, engaging
in a CCE, committing acts of violence in the aid of racketeering activity, using a
firearm in relation to a crime of drug-trafficking, and possessing cocaine base
1. United States v. Roane, 378 F.3d 382, 389-90 (4th Cir. 2004). According to the direct
appeal opinion, from January 4 through February 19, 1992, the following killings occurred: (1)
Tipton stabbed Douglas Talley eighty-four times, shot Douglas Moody and Curtis Thorne, and
observed while Johnson shot Dorothy Armstrong, Anthony Carter, Bobby Long, and Linwood
Chiles; (2) Johnson shot Peyton Johnson ("P. Johnson"), Louis Johnson ("L.Johnson"), Torrick
Brown, Armstrong, Carter, Long, Chiles, and Thorne; and (3) Roane held Talley while Tipton
stabbed him, stabbed Moody eighteen times, shot Brown, and observed while Johnson shot P.
Johnson and L. Johnson. Id. at 390-91; see United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861,903 (4th Cir. 1996)
(affirming all capital convictions and sentences).
2.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 391; see 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (2000) (stating that "any person engaging
in or working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise ... who intentionally kills or
counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of an individual ... may
be sentenced to death"); see also 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (defining "continuing criminal enterprise" as a
felony violation of Chapter 13 of Title 21 of the United States Code that is "part of a continuing
series of violations ... which are undertaken ... in concert with five or more other persons with
respect to whom [the violator] occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other
position of management, and from which such person obtains substantial income or resources").
3.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 389, 391. The jury convicted Tipton of the capital murders of Talley,
Armstrong, Long, Carter, Chiles, and Thorne. Id. at 391. The court dismissed the capital charge
for the murder of L. Johnson, and the jury acquitted Tipton of the murder of Moody. Id.
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with the intent to distribute.4 Johnson was convicted of seven capital murders
and the same noncapital offenses as Tipton.' The jury also convicted Roane on
three capital murder charges and the same noncapital charges as his co-defendants.6
After the sentencing hearing, the jury recommended three death sentences
for Tipton, seven death sentences for Johnson, and one death sentence for
Roane.7 The district court sentenced the three accordingly.' On direct appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the capital
convictions and death sentences.9 The court affirmed all of the other convictions
except for those involving conspiracy.'"
After the Fourth Circuit rejected their appeals, Tipton,Johnson, and Roane
sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia." The district court denied their2
motion for leave to interview jurors and granted a limited discovery motion.'
Although the district court granted Roane an evidentiary hearing on his
ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") and actual innocence claims, the court
granted summary judgment in the United States' favor on all of the petitioners'
other claims. 3 During the June 21, 2002 evidentiary hearing, the court heard
evidence sufficient to convince it that Roane's counsel had rendered ineffective
4.
Id at 391; see 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000) (subjecting "[a] person who... conspires to commit
any offense defined in this subchapter... to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense,
the commission of which was the object of the ... conspiracy"); 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (defining the
punishments for engaging in a CCE); 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2000) (proscribing violent crimes in aid of
racketeering activities); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) (prescribing penalties for the use of a firearm in
commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) (2000) (making it illegal
for "any person knowingly or intentionally-to.., possess with intent to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense, a controlled substance").
Roane, 378 F.3d at 391. Johnson's capital convictions were for the murders of L. Johnson,
5.
Long, Carter, Armstrong, Thorne, Chiles, and P. Johnson. Id.
6.
Id at 391-92. The jury found that Roane had murdered Moody, P. Johnson, and L.
Johnson. Id. at 391.
7.
Id at 392.
8.
Id; see 21 U.S.C. § 848(1) (2000) (stating that "[u]pon the recommendation that the
sentence of death be imposed, the court shall sentence the defendant to death"). Tipton received
the death penalty for his murders of Talley, Chiles, and Thome;Johnson received death sentences
for all of his capital convictions; and Roane received a death sentence for his murder of Moody.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 392.
9.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 392; see Tipton, 90 F.3d at 903 (affirming death sentences).
10.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 392; see Tpton, 90 F.3d at 891 (vacating conspiracy convictions for
violating double jeopardy).
11.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 392; see 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (providing the parameters for habeas
corpus relief from a federal conviction; part of AEDPA).
12.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 392-93.
Id at 393.
13.
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assistance with respect to Roane's guilt or innocence on the one homicide count
for which he was sentenced to death.14 The district court therefore vacated
Roane's conviction and death sentence as to that count. 5 The United States
appealed the court's grant of relief to Roane, and Roane cross-appealed. 6
Despite its grant of summary judgment to the United States, the district
court granted certificates of appealability ("COA") on all of Tipton and
Johnson's claims.'" The Fourth Circuit consolidated all of the defendants'
appeals for consideration.' 8 The court characterized the defendants' claims as
falling within six categories: (1)unconstitutional discrimination during jury
selection; (2) challenges to the sufficiency of evidence proving a CCE; (3) "claims
of prosecutorial misconduct during trial"; (4) claims that the district court
conducted habeas corpus proceedings incorrectly; (5) IAC claims; and (6) claims
of mental retardation. 9
11. Holding
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment
to the United States on Tipton and Johnson's claims and reversed the lower
court's grant of relief to Roane. 2° The court held that the district court had erred
in finding that Roane's counsel had not done a reasonable investigation of
Roane's alibi defense, reversed the district court's grant of relief, and reinstated
Roane's death sentence.2' The court ultimately concluded that the actions of
Tipton, Johnson, and Roane warranted the death penalty for all three.
Il7. Analysis
A. Flawed Indictments
Tipton,Johnson, and Roane argued, under Ring v.Arizona, 3 that they could
not constitutionally be put to death because their indictments did not allege
statutory aggravating factors sufficient to render the charges against them deatheligible.24 Under Ring, any fact that could increase the maximum sentence to
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
reversing
23.
24.

Id at 393-94.
Id at 394.
Id at 395.
Id
Roane, 378 F.3d at 389.
Id at 395-96.
Id.at 411.
Id
Seeid at 411 (affirming the district court's summary judgment against the defendants and
its grant of relief to Roane).
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Roane, 378 F.3d at 396 n.8 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,589 (2002)); see 21 U.S.C.
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25
death must be presented to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 1
The Fourth Circuit pointed out that in federal cases subject to the Indictment
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, United States v. Higgs?6 expanded Ring's
requirements to mandate inclusion of any element, including statutory
aggravating factors, in the indictment.27 The Fourth Circuit, however, following
the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Schriro v. Summerin,2 found
that Ring created a new procedural rule that did not apply retroactively to cases
like this one that were already final on direct appeal when Ring was decided. 9
The court therefore dismissed this claim.'

B. DiscriminationAgainst Women in Juy Selection
Tipton, Johnson, and Roane claimed that the prosecution used its
peremptory strikes in jury selection to discriminate against women jurors. 3 ' The
three noted that the prosecution used only two of its strikes against men and
eight against women and argued that under J.E.B. v. Alabama 2 the prosecution
may not use peremptory strikes to discriminate against potential jurors on the
basis of gender.33 Stating that the defendants "had produced no evidence to
support their claim, other than 'raw figures' of men versus women stricken by the
prosecution," the Fourth Circuit rejected it. 4 The court further found that the
defendants had raised and lost on the discrimination claim on direct appeal, and
it therefore refused to reconsider its original rejection of the claim.35
Tipton,Johnson, and Roane also alleged that their counsel's failure to object
to the prosecution's allegedly discriminatory actions against female venire members during jury selection constituted ineffective assistance.' The Fourth Circuit
§ 848(n)(l)-(12) (2000) (listing aggravating factors that make a person convicted under 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(e) eligible for the death penalty).
25.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 589.
26.
353 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2003).
27.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 396 n.8 (citing United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 297 (4th Cir.
2003)). For a complete discussion of Higgs, see generally Maxwell C. Smith, Case Note, 16 CAP.
DEF.J. 499 (2004) (analyzing United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2003)).

28.

124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).

29.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 396 n.8 (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523 (2004)).
For a more complete discussion of Summer/n, see generally Tamara L. Graham, Case Note, 17 CAP.
DEF.J. 253 (2004) (analyzing Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004)).
30.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 396 n.8.
31.
Id. at 396-97.

32.

511 U.S. 127 (1994).

33.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 396-97 (citingJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994)).
34.
Id at 397.
35.
Id.; see Tpton, 90 F.3d at 881 (finding insufficient evidence to support a claim of gender
discrimination).
36.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 397.
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found that it was not unreasonable for counsel to fail to object because the
United States Supreme Court had not yet ruled on gender discrimination in
J.E.B.37 The court cited its own previous ruling in which it had refused to extend
Batson v. Kentucky' to apply to peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of
gender.39 The Fourth Circuit concluded that counsel could not be deficient for
failing to anticipate new rulings and "for following controlling circuit precedent
at [the] time of trial."'
C. Continuing CriminalEntepriseClaims
The Fourth Circuit laid out the elements for convicting a defendant of an
offense in furtherance of a CCE.4 ' Under 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) and United States v.
Ricks, 42 the prosecution needs to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that" '[the]
defendant committed a felony violation of the federal drug laws... [as] part of
a continuing series of violations of the drug laws.' , 43 The prosecution must also
prove that the series involved five or more persons and that the " 'defendant
served as an organizer or supervisor' " and received " 'substantial income or
resources from the [crimes].' "44
Anticipating the Supreme Court's decision in Richardson v. United States,4
which held that the court must give a jury instruction requiring unanimity as to
the crimes constituting a series in a CCE, Tipton, Johnson, and Roane claimed
on direct appeal that the court's failure to advise the jury on unanimity prejudiced
them. 4 The Fourth Circuit originally rejected this claim on direct appeal because
it found that the jury" '[b]y its verdict... unanimously found each [defendant]
guilty of at least five predicate violations.' "" In its reconsideration of the
defendants' claim on habeas appeal, the Fourth Circuit relied on its previous
decisions to define the lack of a Richardson instruction as a procedural defect
Id
37.
38.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
39.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 397 (citing United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir.
1988)); see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (prohibiting race-based use of peremptory
strikes in jury selection).
40.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 397 (citing United States v. McNamara, 74 F.3d 514, 517 (4th Cir.
1996)).
41.
Id at 398.
882 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1989).
42.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 398 (quoting United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885,890 (4th Cir. 1989));
43.
see also 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (2000) (defining the elements of a CCE).
44.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 398 (quoting Ricks, 882 F.2d at 890-91).
45.
526 U.S. 813 (1999).
46.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 398; see Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 816 (1999)
(requiring a jury instruction that unanimity on the specific crimes is required for finding a CCE).
Roane, 378 F.3d at 398 (quoting Tipton, 90 F.3d at 885).
47.
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subject to harmless error analysis.4" Undertaking such an analysis, the court
concluded that the defendants did not show that they were prejudiced by the
district court's failure to instruct the jury that it needed to agree unanimously on
the CCE predicates.49
Tipton and Johnson further claimed that the district court should have
instructed the jury on three other aspects of the CCE offense. 0 First, they
argued that the jury needed to know that it must agree unanimously on the
identities of the five persons whom the defendants supervised in the CCE.5"
They next claimed that the district court should have told the jury "that certain
categories of persons (i.e., drug kingpins) cannot as a matter of law be
supervisees, and that certain types of relationships (i.e., buyer-seller) cannot
constitute supervision. 5 2 Finally, they asserted that the district court should have
instructed the jury that the prosecution needed to prove "management" to prove
a CCE offense. 3 The Fourth Circuit stated that Tipton and Johnson had
defaulted the first two of these arguments by not raising them at trial or on direct
appeal.' In rejecting the third claim, the Fourth Circuit found that the court had
properly instructed the jury on the supervision element required by 21 U.S.C.
848(c). 5'
Rounding out their CCE claims, Tipton and Johnson argued that their
counsel had been ineffective for not objecting to, or requesting instructions on,
any of the elements of the CCE offense.56 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of these IAC claims and stated that the defendants had
not proven that the lack of a Richardsoninstruction and the lack of an instruction
defining "supervision" had prejudiced them.57 The court also found "that
Richardsondid not change the rule 'that the jury need not unanimously agree on
which five persons were organized, supervised, or managed by the defendant."' 58
The Fourth Circuit therefore concluded that Tipton andJohnson's counsel could
not have been deficient for not requesting a jury instruction on that point.59
48.
202 F.3d
49.
50.
51.

Id.
(citing United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878,883 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Brown,
691, 699 (4th Cir. 2000)).
Id.
Id at 399.
Id.

52.
Id.
53.
Raane, 378 F.3d at 400 n.11.
54.
Id.at 399.
55.
Id at 400 n.ll; see 21 U.S.C.
848(c) (2000) (defining the elements of a continuing
criminal enterprise).
56.
Roane, 378 F.3d. at 398-400.
57.
Id.at 399-400.
58.
Id.at 399 (quoting Sftt, 250 F.3d at 886).

59.

Id.
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D. ErroneousDenialofjuror Interviews
Tipton and Johnson argued that the district court abused its discretion in
not allowing them to interview the jurors from their trial to ascertain if they had
6
Finding that the
been improperly influenced by media coverage of the trial.
defendants had
the
appeal,
court had rejected one of the specific claims on direct
and the
on
appeal,
or
at
trial
it
raising
procedurally defaulted another by not
cautionary
court's
district
the
that
evidence
defendants had not provided
instructions to the jury to ignore outside influences had failed, the Fourth Circuit
rejected this claim.6 ' The court concluded that Tipton and Johnson had not
presented the district court with any reason to allow the interviews and thus
could not claim error on this ground.62
E. LAC Claims
1. Failureto Investigate Gang Activity
In their first claim that their counsel were ineffective, Tipton, Johnson, and
Roane contended that their lawyers failed to investigate gang activities in New
York and NewJersey that would have led to impeachment evidence against many
of the prosecution's witnesses. 63 The Fourth Circuit dismissed this claim on the
prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington. 4 The court concluded that the
evidence trial counsel could have gathered would have been more damning than
beneficial and would not have undermined the "overwhelming evidence.., that
the Defendants were involved in a CCE in the Richmond area, and that their
enterprise had distributed illegal drugs and killed on several occasions in order
to ensure its success. '"65 The Fourth Circuit therefore found that trial counsel's
failure was neither deficient nor prejudicial. 6
2. Failureto Request Morgan Voir Dire
Tipton and Johnson also asserted that their counsel failed by not requesting,
under Mogan v. IlInois,67 a "reverse- Witherspoon" question of jurors during voir
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
a court's
65.
66.
67.

Id.at 403.
Id at 403-04.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 404.
Id at 405.
Id Seegeneral Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (providing the standard for
evaluation of IAC claims).
Roane, 378 F.3d at 405.
Id.
504 U.S. 719 (1992).
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dire.68 The Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois' held that the prosecution
may strike any juror who would refuse to impose the death penalty. 70 Morgan
requires that a defendant be allowed to determine that prospective jurors will not
apply the death penalty automatically, and henceTipton andJohnson claimed that
their counsel should have pursued this line of questioning to ensure a fair jury.7'
The Fourth Circuit rejected this JAC claim based on a lack of prejudice because
it determined that the district court made a sufficient effort to ensure that the
jury contained no automatic-death jurors in violation of Morgan.72
3. Failure to PresentMitigation Evidence ConcerningPrison Conditions
Tipton and Johnson further argued that their counsel were ineffective for
failing to present evidence in mitigation that prison life would not be all cable
television and literary groups.73 Tipton andJohnson contended that their counsel
should have responded to the prosecution's painting of life in prison as pleasurable with evidence of actual prison conditions. 74 The Fourth Circuit found
that trial counsel had made a reasonable tactical choice not to introduce such
evidence in an effort to avoid the prosecution's asserting that Tipton and
Johnson would be dangerous in prison and comparing prison life to the lives of
the victims that the two had critically wounded during their violent crimes. 75 The
court concluded, therefore, that trial counsel were not ineffective on this
ground.7 6

4. Waiver of Roane's PresenceDuringJury Selection
Roane next claimed that his counsel failed by waiving Roane's right to be
present during jury selection.7 7 Roane argued that Nearv. Cunningbam78 stands for
the proposition that "a capital defendant may not waive his presence at trial."79

Roane asserted that had he been present throughout jury selection, he would
68.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 405 (citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 733 (1992)); see also
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968) (allowing the prosecution to use voir dire to
eliminate any juror who would never impose a death sentence).
69.
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
70.
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520.
71.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 405 (citing Morgan, 504 U.S. at 733).
72.
Id at 405-06.
73.
Id at 406.
74.
Id.
75.
Id
76.
Id.
77.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 408.
78.
313 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1963).
79.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 408 (citing Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929, 931 (4th Cir. 1963)).
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have demanded that his counsel remove three jurors whose presence on the jury
ultimately prejudiced his defense.' The Fourth Circuit declined to review this
claim because it had rejected it previously on direct appeal under plain error
review.8 '
F. Mental RetardationClaims
Johnson's final claims were that his status as mentally retarded precluded the
Government from executing him and that his counsel were ineffective for failing
to argue his mental retardation during sentencing.8 12 Title 21 of the United States
Code § 848(1) states that "[a] sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a
person who is mentally retarded." 3 The district court determined that an I.Q.
of 75 or below classifies a person as mentally retarded.' Johnson claimed that
his I.Q. score of 77 was inflated and that his actual I.Q. fell below the mental
retardation cut-off of 75.5 He argued that his attorney was ineffective in not
asserting that his score of 77 was inflated.' The Fourth Circuit found instead
that his original I.Q. score was valid and that his counsel could not be faulted for
87
failing to "second-guess" the report from their appointed mental health expert.
The court therefore dismissed this claim.'
G. The Government's Appeal
In its original consideration of Roane's habeas corpus petition, the district
court granted him relief on his IAC claim that his counsel had failed to
investigate his alibi defense adequately.8 9 The district court found that Roane's
attorney missed evidence that he could have used to confirm Roane's alibi for the
Moody murder.9 In its de novo review of the district court's grant of relief for
IAC, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Roane's counsel had done a "reasonable
and thorough" investigation of Roane's alibi that he had been at a hotel with

80.
81.
82.

Id
Id
Id

83. 21 U.S.C. § 848(!) (2000); seeAtkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002) (concluding that
the execution of a mentally retarded person would constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
84.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 408.
85.
Id at 408-09.
86.
Id at 409.
87.
Id
Id
88.
89.
Id
90.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 410.
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Carmella Cooley on the night of Moody's murder.9 The court pointed to the
facts that Roane's attorney had sought the records of the hotel and had even
searched the records himself for information pertaining to the "only relevant
night. 9 2 Despite the fact that Roane's habeas investigator had found exculpatory
evidence in the same records, the Fourth Circuit chose to defer to trial counsel's
investigation, and "declin[ed] to act as a Monday-morning quarterback and
second-guess [trial counsel's] efforts, simply because [the Fourth Circuit was]
now armed with more information and the benefit of hindsight. ' 93 Finding the
district court's Monday-morning quarterbacking to be in error, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the lower court's decision and reinstated Roane's conviction and death
sentence for the murder of Douglas Moody.94
IV. Application to Virginia Practice
A. JurorInterviews
The Fourth Circuit found that the district court had not erroneously denied
the defendants leave to interview jurors after the trial." Requiring at least "a
threshold showing of improper outside influence" to impeach a jury verdict, the
court concluded that the defendants' lack of evidence was insufficient to survive
summary judgment.96 The dilemma posed by this standard is that without leave
to conduct juror interviews, a defendant will find it difficult to gather enough
evidence to make that threshold showing. The defendants knew that their trial
had been highly publicized and that the publicity had affected at least two jurors,
one of whom the court dismissed.9 7 Without the ability to investigate further
influences on the jury by asking the jury itself, the defendants were effectively
hamstrung in their efforts to prove that the jury had been prejudiced by outside
influences.
B. Reversal of Relief
The Fourth Circuit's reversal of the district court's grant of habeas relief to
Roane for his IAC claim raises more questions about the subjectivity of the
reasonableness standard. The district court found that Roane's attorney's limited
attempt to find evidence to support Roane's alibi fell below the kind of
investigation a reasonable attorney might make and that it thus prejudiced the

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 410-11.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 394, 411.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 404.
Roane, 378 F.3d at 404.
Id. at 403.

2004]

UNITED STATES V. ROANE

outcome of Roane's case. 98 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit was impressed that
the attorney had gone to the hotel and looked for records himself. The court
did not sanction the lower court's view that Roane's attorney should have
subpoenaed all of the records from the period in question or expanded his search
beyond the single night of the murder."° It is odd that given the extreme
importance of an alibi that can prove actual innocence, the Fourth Circuit lauded
the limited efforts of the attorney. The Fourth Circuit chided the district court
for relying on authorities in which the factual circumstances were dissimilar to
an extreme, involving attorneys who "neglected to investigate, or [whose]
investigation was . . . cursory."t

One might argue, however, that the

information so readily unearthed by the habeas investigator suggests that the
investigation that Roane's attorney performed could indeed be classified as
cursory.
V. Conclusion
Roane presents the unusual case of a triple federal death sentence. It also
highlights the subjectivity that can infect a habeas corpus proceeding. Although
the Fourth Circuit readily deferred to the district court's judgment in validating
the multiple death sentences for two of the defendants, it scrutinized with
extreme care the lower court's grant of relief for the single defendant who had
been sentenced to death for only one capital murder. Roane illustrates that the
ever-slippery Stickland standard of what might be reasonable under the
circumstances still depends largely upon a judge's own sense of reasonableness
without reference to professional norms. The case also calls into question the
Supreme Court's recent classification of the Ring rule, so crucial in cases in which
death is a possibility, as procedural and non-retroactive.

Tamara L. Graham

98.
99.
100.
101.

Id at 394.
Id at 410.
Id.
Id at 411.

